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Full Idea
The Adverbial Theory of perception holds that the predicates which other theories take as picking out the properties of objects are really adverbs of the perceptual verb; ..instead of strange objects, we just have properties of experiences.
Clarification
'Adverbial' because we don't see a blue object, we 'see bluely'
Gist of Idea
The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects
Source
Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 5.42)
Book Ref
Crane,Tim: 'Elements of Mind' [OUP 2001], p.138
A Reaction
Promising. It fits secondary qualities all right, but what about primary? I 'see bluely', but can I 'see squarely'?
| 15816 | 'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book' [Chisholm] |
| 15817 | If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'? [Chisholm] |
| 15818 | So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them [Chisholm] |
| 5691 | The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly' [Shoemaker] |
| 8897 | The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour] |
| 6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
| 6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
| 4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
| 6637 | How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe] |
| 7640 | Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund] |
| 7641 | Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund] |